Abstract-With the ever growing demands for spectrum, au-service provider is twofold-get a chunk of the spectrum and thorities (e.g., FCC in United States) are defining ways that allow successfully serve as many users as possible. As both the reallocation of spectrum bands that are under-utilized. In this number of end users emaximizing the revenue the spectrum allocator must also
I. INTRODUCTION and fresh auction is initiated.
Auction theory has been used to determine the value of It has been well established that spectrum allocation and a commodity that has an undetermined or variable price. usage in most countries have been inefficient [8] . This is A large number of Internet auction sites have been set primarily because of the way spectrum has been allocated for up to process both consumer-oriented and business-oriented different services. Chunks of spectrum have been statically transactions. Currently, most auction sites (e.g., eBay [16] ) allocated for both licensed and unlicensed services. Recent support a basic bidding strategy through a proxy service for studies have shown that the spectrum usage is both space and a single-unit auction where ascending bidding continues till a time dependent, and therefore static allocation of spectrum winner evolves. In a single unit auction, Vickrey proved that often leads to low spectrum utilization [17] . In order to "English" and "Dutch" type auctions yield the same expected break away from the inflexibility and inefficiencies of static revenue under the assumptions of risk neutral participants and allocation, a new concept of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) privately known value drawn from a common distribution [12] . is being investigated [5] . In DSA, spectrum bands are allocated However, with emerging markets like electricity and spectrum and de-allocated dynamically from the coordinated access bands, single unit auctions are falling short to address the band (CAB) [6] . Note that, this dynamic band is in addition to issues where multiple units are put up for auction and multiple the statically allocated spectrum that all WSPs already have. winners emerge [1] , [13] . As bidders compete for a part of DSA along with the presence of multiple wireless service the available resource and are willing to pay a price for that providers (WSPs) in any geographic region will force com-part only, the kind of auction model needed must be more petition among the providers. Essentially, a wireless service efficient and is being currently investigated [3] , [4] , [14] . provider buys spectrum from the spectrum owner (for example, Moreover, as the bidding behavior is different for different Federal Communications Commission in the United States of auction mechanisms, it is obvious that the outcome of these America) and sells the spectrum to the end users in the form auctions will be dependent on specific auction types and need of services (bandwidth). In such a scenario, the goal of each to be studied separately. Most works done so far on multi-unit From here on, we use the terms wireless service provider In contrast to the above assumptions, this research is differ-.
. ' ' . .
.~~and bidder interchangeably. Similarly, FCC and the auctioneer ent from existing studies on multi-unit auction. We investigate have the same meaning. Wireless service providers bid for the a special case where WSPs (bidders) are granted at most one spectrum chunk from the pool of spectrum chunks in each bns e 3 {i ..~}dnt h -i etrfo the bidders submitted to the auctioneer where bi is the bid allocation period. In Fig. 1 We analyze and compare the sequential and concurrent bid than the bid bi. Thus probability of bidder i winning the (k + submission mechanisms under the above mentioned auction 1)th band can be given by, setting. We assume auctions among the WSPs to occur pe-
riodically. Each of these auction periods is called dynamic n-k-1 spectrum access (DSA) period. In the sequential mechanism, I| P(bj <bi j c i j E (n -k -1) bidders) (5) spectrum bands are auctioned one after another in one DSA period and each winning bidder gets at most one spectrum Using equation 4 in equation 5, we obtain the probability band. Winning bidders are not allowed to participate for the of a bidder winning the (k + 1)th auction round as rest of the auction rounds in that particular DSA period.
(n-k-1) Thus each DSA period consists of m auction rounds with Pseq(ith bidder winning)
-bm-(6) decreasing number of bidders. In contrast to the sequential bid, Vmax -bmin) in concurrent bidding, each DSA period consists of only one B. Optimal bid analysis auction round. All the bidders submit their bids concurrently Let us now focus on the optimal bidding analysis for at the beginning of each DSA period. When one DSA period se uential biddin . We define optimal bid of ith bidder as the expires, all the bands are returned to the auctioneer and the q g ' .
.~~~~~~~~~~~~bid that wins a spectrum band and maximizes the payoff for ith process repeats for both the sequential and concurrent bid bidder. In other words, optimal bid denotes the reservation bid submission mechanisms. of a WSP, exceeding which, the WSP is in the risk of obtaining III. SEQUENTIAL AUCTION WITH SUBSTITUTABLE BANDS low payoff. If on the other hand, the bid submitted is less than
In the sequential spectrum bands auction, m spectrum bands the optimal bid, probability of winning also decreases. are auctioned one after another. First, n bidders submit their
The ith bidder's expected payoff is given by, sealed bids for band s, and the winner is determined. Winner Ei = (Vi-bi) x P(ith bidder winning) ( (n-k-1)
A. Probability of winning Vmax-bmin We assume a time instance when the auction for k spectrum We look for the particular bid b* which will maximize Ei. To bands are over and k winners have emerged. As a result, there maximize Ei, we take the first derivative: are still (m -k) spectrum bands left and (n -k) bidders are &Ei (Vi -bi)(n -k -1)(bi -bmin)(n-k-2) participating. We assume that bids from all the bidders are Ob (V b
(n-k-1) uniformly distributed. The probability density function of bid ( max-bmin -submissions in sequential auction mechanism can be given by, (bi bmin)(n k
1 (2) and equate to 0. We obtain (Vmax -bmin)(n-k-1)
(2) and equate to 0. We obtain the optimal bid for ith bidder in where, Vmax is the maximum valuation possible of a spectrum (k + 1)th auction round as band and bmin is the minimum bid of all the bids submitted b* (n -k -1)Vi + bmin (10) by the existing bidders. seq (n-k) Now, let us assume that a bidder i submits a bid of bi at the In our auction formulation, as all the bidders are rational, beginning of (k + 1)th band auction. All the other (n -k -1) the natural inclination of the losing bidders would be to bidders also submit their corresponding bids for the (k + 1)th increase their bids (if the bids are less than the bidders' true band. Bidder i will win the (k + 1)th band if and only if all valuation prices). As the auction progresses, bmin will be nonthe (n -k -1) bidders' bids are less than bi. Let us first find decreasing. Thus in the steady state, with increase in auction the probability that any other bid bj, (j e (n -k -1) bidders) rounds, bmin Vmin, where Vmin is the minimum true is less than bi. The probability that any bid bj < bi, such that, valuation price of the bands. Substituting f(b) and integrating, we obtain, bids together at the beginning of the DSA period. As all the bands are substitutable, each bidder submits just one bid.
P(j< bi j + i; j E (n-kc-i) bidders) b= -bmiin (4) Highest m/ bidders are awarded with a spectrum band each.
P(b~~~~~~~~~~~~~~V max -bmiin
Losing bidders get the information of minimum bid submitted.
If bidder i is to win the (k + 1)th band, we need to calculate Let us analyze the properties of concurrent bid submission the probability that all the (n -k-1) bidders' bids are lower mechanism.
A. Probability of winning C. Dominant strategy -Sequential and Concurrent auction In concurrent auction setting, a bidder's choice would be to
We present a comparative study between the optimal bids be among the highest m bidders and to maximize the payoff presented in equations 10 and 16. Under this scenario, let us profit. The probability of winning would then boil down to analyze the difference between the optimal bids in sequential the probability of generating a bid such that all the bids from and concurrent auctions. The expected payoff is given by
Simplifying we obtain, Ei = (Vi -bi) x Pcon(ith bidder winning) The equation for b* represents the optimal bid a bidder participating in (k + 1)th auction round have the chance to could offer for winning at most one spectrum band. This revisit their bids thus increasing the minimum bid. Note that, bid is optimal in the sense that this is the minimum bid to compared to concurrent auction, in sequential auction, bidders maximize the probability of winning a spectrum band and thus get the chance to revisit their bids (m -1) times more in each maximizes the expected payoff.
DSA period. Then in concurrent auction, as the bidders have Next, we present a comparison between optimal bids for less number of chances to revisit their bidding strategies, it is both sequential and concurrent auction to study the dominant clear that minimum bid submitted in concurrent auction would strategies for bidders.
be less than the minimum bid submitted in sequential auction.
After k spectrum bands auctions are over let minimum bids
With all the values for bands known, it is obvious that a in sequential and concurrent auctions are, bmin and bmim2 bidder i will choose to submit bid for that spectrum band respectively; such that bmim2 < bmimi. submitted from all these I bidders. If only 1 bidder aim for the band j the revenue generated will be the bid submitted by known to all the bidders. Thus as we assume the auction model b.
.~~~~~the sole bidder. If no bidder aims at the band the revenue to achieve the steady state, minimum bid submitted both for e w generated will be zero from band y sequential and concurrent mechanism would be the same. Then the difference in optimal bids between sequential and Then the total revenue generated from all the n bidders and 
BANDS
Thus all the bands are not sold out in auction even if n > m In this section, we present the concurrent auction model for and thus auctioneer do not get full benefit of all the bands. m non-substitutable bands. For every bidder, the value of each of these m bands is different. We assume that bidders have D Sequential auction: Similarly, we formulate the revenue complete information about the valuation and rankings of the generated from the sequential auction. The total revenue bands. Under the complete information scenario, n bidders generated can be presented as a recursive expression submit bids concurrently at the beginning of the allocation period. m spectrum bands, i.e.,
VI. SIMULATION MODEL AND RESULTS
Vi ={Vji, Vj2, ,Vim} (25) In this section, we present a comparison between sequenLet the reservation price of ith bidder for all m spectrum bands tia an ocretbdigfrbohsbtttbeadnn be~~~~~~~~~~~~~s u b s t i t u t a b l e bands. We assume the number of bands to be Ri={rji, ri2,* rim} (26) less than the number of bidders for the auction to take place. number of bidders and spectrum bands. As shown in the analysis earlier, the revenue generated in the sequential auction setting is more than that in the concurrent one. In fact, with (a) increase in number of bands and bidders, revenue generated in sequential setting is almost 200% more than the revenue in concurrent setting, thus proving sequential auction to be more beneficial from the auctioneer's perspective.
In This happens due to the fact that as more and more number of bands are available in the common pool for the auction (m -*> n), greedy bidders will get more incentive bidding less than their true valuation prices as shown in the theoretical Here, we compare the results for non-substitutable bands. In analysis shown earlier which will not happen in the sequential this case, as the bands are not of equal value, we assume the auction. Thus sequential auction setting is clearly a better band's true value follow a uniform distribution with minimum choice for auctioneer to generate more revenue. and maximum being 450 and 500 units respectively. We follow
Next, we present the optimal bid for a specific bidder to the same distribution of bids as mentioned in the previous win a spectrum band for both sequential and concurrent bid subsection. submission mechanisms in figures 4(a) and 4(b). It can be In figures 5(a) and 5(b), we present the revenue with both observed that the optimal bid for the concurrent auction is number of bidders and bands. It is clear that sequential auction less than the optimal bid for the sequential auction and even provides better revenue for the auctioneer than the concurrent decreasing with m -* n. Thus in concurrent auction setting, setting under non-substitutable bands. auctioneer will not receive any incentive increasing the number In figures 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c), we present the revenue of bands in the common pool thus reducing the whole purpose generated by auctioneer in both sequential and concurrent of dynamic spectrum allocation, bid submission mechanisms with increase in auction rounds. Similar to the previous case, we assume that the bidders does not prove beneficial. We considered two metrics: revenue use auction histories of previous rounds to submit their bids generated by auctioneer and optimal bid of the bidders for in future rounds. We find that the difference in the revenue comparison of sequential and concurrent auctions. We have generated between sequential setting and concurrent setting shown that sequential auction proves to be the better choice under non-substitutable bands is even more than that of the for DSA auctions. substitutable bands of previous case (note the y-axis scale changes in figures 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c)). Thus sequential auction 
